International and Intergenerational

Environmental Externalities by Pecchenino, Rowena A.
  
Scand. J. of Economics 99(3), 371–387, 1997
International and Intergenerational
Environmental Externalities*
A. Andrew John
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22903-3288, USA
Rowena A. Pecchenino
Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824-1038, USA
Abstract
We examine a world in which policymakers’ actions in a given country at a given time have
long-lived effects on a common resource: the global environment. We consider the first best
in which long-lived planners behave cooperatively, then examine the allocation of resources
when there is non-cooperation across countries, across time, or both. Finally we analyze the
dynamic behavior of the economy along balanced growth paths. It is found that while long-
lived international institutions are necessary to internalize all externalities, cooperation at a
point in time may be harmful to future generations.
I. Introduction
The planet Earth is an ecosystem on which all life depends. Humankind
has divided this ecosystem into sovereign states, and the laws governing
each nation define property rights over the resources controlled by that
nation. Not all resources are unambiguously controlled by a single nation.
Some are jointly held by the global community. Of these some are common
property resources that are controlled, at least in part, by international
institutions and agreements. Others are open access resources that are
controlled by no one. Actions taken by a single country often adversely
affect these jointly held resources, and so influence economic well-being in
other nations.
While political economy divides nations, mortality divides generations.
The resources of an economy at a given time are controlled by policy-
makers alive at that time. But environmental and other resources have
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value that extend beyond the lifetime of individual agents, so actions taken
by current policymakers affect the well-being of future generations.
It follows that environmental externalities may extend across both time
and national borders. Examples include: the poisoning of the Mediterran-
ean Sea by effluvium, cf. The Economist (1991); global warming due to CO2
emissions from the burning of fossil fuels, and the related problem of
ozone depletion from CFC emissions, cf. Firor (1990), Schelling (1992),
Morgenstern (1991) and Nordhaus (1991); and deforestation by acid rain
due to SO2 emissions, cf. Dowlatabadi and Harrington (1990) and Bui
(1992). These problems are long-lived and international in nature, so
policies of short-lived national governments are unlikely to take full
account of either the immediate costs, because of the international effects,
or the long-run costs, because of the intergenerational effects.
Various institutions could internalize these externalities. Examples
include international treaties such as the Montreal Protocol, and long-
lived domestic institutions such as the National Park Service in the U.S. In
many cases, such institutions are absent, and where they do exist they are
usually imperfect and limited in scope. Treaties are often hindered by
domestic political concerns, and may be difficult to enforce. Domestic
policymakers meanwhile, have limited ability to commit their successors to
policy actions.
We examine a world in which policymakers’ actions in a given country at
a given time have long-lived effects on a common resource: the global
environment. We consider the first best in which long-lived planners
behave cooperatively. We then examine the allocation of resources when
there is non-cooperation across countries, across time, or both. Not
surprisingly, we find that long-lived international institutions are necessary
to internalize all externalities. More interestingly, cooperation at a point in
time may be harmful to future generations. We analyze the dynamic behav-
ior of the model and find conditions under which it displays balanced
growth. Depending on technological parameters, the model can exhibit
either growth or decline.
There is a sizeable literature on the international transmission of pollu-
tion; see Baumol and Oates (1988) and d’Arge (1974). In contrast to the
literature on trade and the environment, we restrict interaction to the
individual country’s effect on the global environment and the spillover
effect from global to local resources.1 Our work extends Markusen (1975)
1 See e.g. Eaton and Engers (1992), Ludema and Wooton (1994) and Chichilnisky (1994).
Because the two countries produce a single homogeneous good in our model, there is no
static incentive for trade, although intertemporal trades (consumption loans) between non-
cooperative long-lived planners could still arise; see footnote 11. Our exclusion of trade is
close in spirit to Barrett (1991, 1992) and Hoel (1991).
© The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics 1997.
372 A. A. John and R. A. Pecchenino
in that we consider coordination problems that arise when nations share
and independently affect a common resource, but we assume that global
environmental quality is long-lived and affects the productivity of local
resources.
We also consider the dynamic general equilibrium effects of the strat-
egic choice of environmental policies. Hoel (1991), Barrett (1991, 1992)
and Ihori (1996) examine the strategic behavior of countries in setting
unilateral or bilateral policies. Nordhaus (1990), John and Pecchenino
(1994), Smulders (1995a) and Bovenberg and Smulders (1995) model
environmental issues in dynamic general equilibrium growth models, but
in closed economy settings; see Smulders (1995b) for a good review of
environmental endogenous growth models. Nordhaus and Yang (1996)
develop a dynamic multicountry model, Bac (1996) presents a dynamic
two-country game with incomplete information, and Beltratti (1993)
models growth in a two-country dynamic model. None of these models
considers intergenerational effects, however.2
Environmental externalities can arise from either production or
consumption, and can enter either preferences or technologies. Thus we
have four possible channels for externalities. First, production might
directly affect welfare, as when logging leads to extinction of a species that
has existence value to consumers. Second, production might affect current
or future production possibilities, as when pollution of the ocean reduces
stocks of fish. Third, consumption might have external effects on welfare,
as when automobile use causes smog, a source of disutility. Fourth,
consumption might have external effects on production, as when CO2
emissions from automobiles cause greenhouse warming and so influence
agricultural output.
The distinction between sources of externality is not especially germane
to our concerns. We model the externality as a byproduct of consumption,
so only the production of consumption goods harms the environment; by
changing the technology for environmental improvement we could equiva-
lently view the externality as coming from production.3 The ultimate
impact of the external effect is more significant. When the environment
enters agents’ utilities, changes in environmental quality alter the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and environment, causing agents
to alter their allocation of resources between consumption and environ-
2 To our knowledge, this is the first paper to address both intergenerational and international
environmental externalities, although John, Pecchenino and Schreft (1993) consider both
types of externality in a model of the arms race.
3 In our model the only other use of output is environmental enhancement. In a model with
consumption-saving decisions there would be another dimension: saving would defer pollu-
tion. We do not view such timing issues as essential.
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mental improvement. When external effects operate through the tech-
nology, changes in environmental quality affect the total resources
available. Our model contains both effects.4
Our model is specified in terms of countries and generations. Although
these terms can be interpreted literally, we emphasize that they need not
be. A country in our setting is the largest coalition that can sustain coop-
eration with regard to the environment. This could be larger than a single
country, perhaps the European Union, or smaller than a country, perhaps
a state or region in the U.S.5 Likewise, a generation in our setting is the set
of agents whose welfare is considered by current policymakers. We do not
rule out intergenerational altruism; we do allow that it may be
incomplete.6
We present our model in Section II and our basic analysis in Section III.
Section IV contains discussion, Section V examines balanced growth
paths, and Section VI concludes.
II. The Environment
Consider two infinite horizon economies — the home and the foreign
country — comprised of finitely-lived individuals. Let lowercase letters
denote home country variables, starred lowercase letters (*) denote
foreign country variables, and uppercase letters denote global variables.
We assume that a planner represents each economy, so all variables are
economy-wide aggregates. For brevity, we only present the equations for
the home country.
A new generation is born at each date t in each country and lives for one
period. Population in the home country at date t is denoted by lt, and grows
at rate n: lt+1 = (1+n)lt. Each agent possesses one unit of labor.
We distinguish between two interconnected aspects of the environment:
environmental capital (hereafter capital), Kt, an input into production, and
4 In Markusen (1975), Luema and Wooton (1992), John and Pecchenino (1994) and John et
al. (1995), the environment affects utility; in e.g. Beltratti, Chichilnisky and Heal (1993) and
Beltratti (1993), it affects technology. Bovenberg and Smulders (1995) and Smulders (1995a)
include both channels.
5 Often there are more than two countries acting non-cooperatively. For our qualitative
analysis we require only that there is more than one.
6 We are agnostic on whether intergenerational or international externalities are actually
more important in the world. The Coase theorem might suggest that there is little hope of
internalizing intergenerational externalities, since agents of different generations cannot
meet. If so, intragenerational externalities are easier to internalize. Conversely, perhaps
because of transaction costs from political considerations, countries do not always succeed in
behaving cooperatively and, at the same time, it is possible that intergenerational altruism
takes care of external effects across time.
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environmental quality (hereafter quality), Qt, which affects utility. Agents
use capital and labor to produce output, which can be used for consump-
tion or to improve quality. Both quality and capital are global public
goods.
Specifically, generation t agents in the home country inherit global
capital, Kt. Agents get no utility from leisure and so supply their labor
inelastically. Labor and capital are combined to produce output, yt:
yt = g(Kt) lt, gp( · )a0, gP ( · )R0. (1)
Output can be consumed or used to improve the quality of the
environment:
yt = ct+ht, (2)
where ct denotes aggregate consumption and ht denotes the aggregate
resources devoted to enhancement of environmental quality. Quality is
given by
Qt = v(Kt, ht, h*t ), (3)
where v1( · ), v2( · ), v3( · ) are all non-negative, and v22( · )R0, v33( · )R0.
Agents have utility defined over (per capita) consumption and end-of-
period quality: U = U (ct/lt, Qt); U1( · )a0, U2( · )a0, U11( · )R0, U22( · )R0.
We assume that the utility function is identical for agents in both countries.
Finally, the environmental capital bequeathed to generation t+1 is
Kt+1 = f (Qt, ct, c*t ), (4)
where f1( · )E0, f2( · )R0 and f3( · )R0.7
III. The Social Planners’ Problems
Cooperative Long-lived Planners: Transferable Resources
First consider the case where long-lived planners behave cooperatively.
We allow a transfer of Tt units of output from the home to the foreign
country. The planners solve the following maximization problem:
maxL= +
l
t=0
y t CvtltU A
ct
lt
, QtB+v*t l*t U A
c*t
l*t
, QtB+lt(g (Kt) ltµTtµctµht)
7 The timing of our model is such that the benefits of enhancement are realized by the current
generation, but the costs of consumption only affect future generations. This particular
timing is not crucial. What matters is that the current generation see at least some benefit
from enhancement, and that there is also some intergenerational effect. That is, we could
easily generalize our model to include consumption as arguments in v( ), and enhancement
as arguments in f ( ) — so some benefit from enhancement occurs with a lag.
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+l*t (g*(Kt) l*t+Ttµc*tµh*t )+(mt+m*t ) (v (Kt, ht, h*t )µQt)
+(jt+j*t ) ( f (Qt, ct, c*t )µKt+1)D .
Here, vt and v*t represent the bargaining strengths of the planners.8 We
assume also that utility in each country is weighted according to the size of
the population in each country.9 The terms l, l*, (m+m*) and (j+j*)
represent Lagrange multipliers. We write the multipliers on the quality
and capital constraints as the sum of two terms representing the shadow
value of the resource in each country. The first-order conditions from this
problem are:
lt = l*t (5)
lt = vtU1(t)+(jt+j*t ) f2(t) (6)
l*t = v*t U*1 (t)+(jt+j*t ) f3(t) (7)
lt = (mt+m*t )v2(t) (8)
l*t = (mt+m*t )v3(t) (9)
(mt+m*t ) = vtltU2(t)+v*t l*t U*2 (t)+(jt+j*t ) f1(t) (10)
(jt+j*t ) = y [l t+1lt+1gp (t+1)+l*t+1l*t+1g*p (t+1)+(mt+1+m*t+1)v1(t+1)]
(11)
plus the resource constraints, where U(t) is shorthand for U(ct/lt, Qt),
etc.
Because of the transfer, the shadow value of output is equated in each
country (equation (5)). Together with (6) and (7), this implies that the
marginal utility of consumption, adjusted for bargaining strength and the
effect on the future environment, will be equated in the two countries:
vtU1(t)+(jt+j*t ) f2(t) = v*t U*1(t)+(jt+j*t ) f3(t). (12)
Here, (jt+j*t ) is the shadow value of the future environment. From (5), (8)
and (9), the marginal benefit of enhancement is equated across
countries:
v2(t) = v3(t). (13)
8 We include both v and v* in order to facilitate presentation; obviously it is the relative
bargaining strength (v/v*) that affects outcomes.
9 This is a convenient normalization; it entails no loss of generality since the v’s can be time-
varying. Time-invariant v’s correspond to utilitarian social welfare functions. If v declines at
rate n then the planners value the utility of a representative agent in each period. There is
also no loss of generality in the assumption of a single discount rate, since country-specific
discount rates could be captures by different rates of change for v and v*.
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The static cross-country conditions (12) and (13) hold in all time
periods.
Define Smut = ltU2(t) and Smu*t = l*t U*2(t). From (6), (8) and (10),
vtU1(t)+(jt+j*t ) f2(t) = v2(t) [vtSmut+v*tSmu*t+(jt+j*t ) f1(t)]. (14)
This is the within-country efficiency condition for the two uses of output.
The l.h.s. is the marginal benefit from consumption: there is a direct utility
benefit, and a cost from reduced capital in t+1 (valued at the shadow price
(jt+j*t )). The r.h.s. gives the marginal benefit from enhancement. The
direct benefit (according to the standard Samuelson approach to public
goods) equals the (weighted) sum of marginal utilities in both countries.
Enhancement increases capital at t+1; this is valued at (jt+j*t ).
Finally, equation (11) gives the dynamic linkage in the model: the value
of capital at the end of period t is measured by its discounted contribution
to output next period (valued at the shadow price l = l*) plus its
discounted contribution to end-of-period quality in t+1. From (5), (6), (8)
and (11),
jt+j*t = y Ampkt+1+mpk*t+1+
v1(t+1)
v2(t+1)B [vt+1U1(t+1)
+f2(t+1) (jt+1+j*t+1)] (15)
where mpkt+1 = lt+1gp(t+1) and mpk*t+1 = l*t+1g*p (t+1). We obtain a
recursive definition of the value of capital at the end of period t. An extra
unit of capital yields mpk+mpk* extra units of output in period t+1, and
raises quality by an amount equal (in output terms) to v1( · )/v2( · ). More
output means more consumption at t+1, but this in turn means lower
capital in t+2.
Cooperative Long-lived Planners: Non-transferable Resources
Cross-country environmental agreements in practice usually do not
include direct transfers of resources. Therefore we now assume that, for
political or technological reasons, output cannot be transferred across
national borders. The maximization problem is as above, with Tt = 0, which
implies that the shadow value of output will in general differ across coun-
tries (l8l*).
Whereas there were previously two cross-country optimality conditions,
equating the marginal benefits from enhancement and the marginal bene-
fits from consumption, there is now a single cross-country condition:
[vtU1(t)+(jt+j*t ) f2(t)]/v2(t) = [v*t U*1(t)+(jt+j*t ) f3(t)]/v3(t). (16)
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The l.h.s. is the (weighted) marginal benefit from higher consumption in
the home country when quality falls by one unit; the r.h.s. is the corre-
sponding term for the foreign country. The two are equated because the
planners place the same shadow value (m+m*) on quality. As before, both
countries internalize the effect of their own consumption on output in the
other country (through the effect on capital). The within-country optimal-
ity condition is unchanged (see (14)); the intertemporal condition now
reflects the different shadow value of output in the two countries:
(jt+j*t ) = y [lt+1mpkt+1+l*t+1mpk*t+1+(mt+1+m*t+1)v1(t+1)]. (17)
Non-cooperative Long-lived Planners
Now consider the case of long-lived planners who behave non-cooper-
atively. In general, such two-player dynamic games are complicated.10 We
focus on the case where agents precommit to a sequence of strategies:
agents take as given the complete sequence of strategies in the other
country. This specification is very tractable and provides the cleanest
comparison with our other cases.
Agents in the home country solve the following maximization
problem:
maxL= +
l
t=1
y t CvtltU A
ct
lt
, QtB+lt(g (Kt) ltµctµht)+mt(v(Kt, ht, h*t )µQt)
+jt( f (Qt, ct, c*t )µKt+1)D .
The first-order conditions from this problem are simply (6), (8), (10) and
(11) with all foreign country multipliers (l*, m*, j*) set equal to zero.
The within-country and intertemporal optimality conditions are
vtU1(t)+jt f2(t) = v2(t) [vtSmut+jt f1(t)]. (18)
jt = y ASmpk (t+1)+
v1(t+1)
v2 (t+1)B (vt+1U1(t+1)+f2(t+1)jt+1). (19)
The home country no longer internalizes its effects on the welfare of the
other country, so (18) includes the marginal utilities of agents in the home
10 See Bac (1996) for analysis of such a dynamic game. Our simpler approach is also that
adopted by Nordhaus and Yang (1996).
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country only, and (19) excludes the value of capital in the foreign country.
There are no cross-country optimality conditions.11
Short-lived Planners
The analyses for short-lived planners are special cases of the above. First,
suppose agents internalize the intra- but not the inter-generational
external effects. This problem corresponds to cooperative long-lived plan-
ners, with no value placed on the future environment. The first-order
conditions are equations (5)–(11) with j = j* = 0, and are easily inter-
preted. There is the cross-country efficiency condition for enhancement
(v2(t) = v3(t)), a cross-country condition for the allocation of consumption,
reflecting the bargaining power of the planners, (vtU1(t) = v*t U*1(t)), and a
within-country condition (vtU1(t) = v2(t) (vtSmut+v*t Smu*t )).
When transfers are not possible, the first-order conditions are those of
the long-lived cooperative planners’ problem without transfers, with
j = j* = 0. The cross-country efficiency condition for enhancement is
vtU1(t)/v2(t) = v*t U*1(t)/v3 (t); the within-country efficiency condition is
unchanged.
Finally, the case of non-cooperative short-lived planners corresponds to
the long-lived noncooperative planner case with jt = 0. The first-order
conditions are (6)–(11) with j = j* = l* = m* = 0, yielding a within-
country efficiency condition in each country: U1(t) = v2(t)Smut.
IV. Discussion
International Cooperation
In each period, planners choose the allocation of output between
consumption and enhancement. Short-lived non-cooperative planners
equate the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and quality
to the marginal rate of transformation. Cross-country cooperation without
transfers lets the planners internalize the effects of their enhancement on
the welfare of agents in the other country. Since enhancement bestows a
positive externality, cooperation results in more enhancement and less
11 This specification excludes borrowing and lending. We could permit consumption loans
between the planners, so that (for example) the country which is relatively more patient will
initially lend to the other country (run a trade surplus), and will be repaid in later periods. It
is straightforward to show that the growth rate of l must equal the growth rate of l* in this
case.
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consumption in both countries.12 Greater enhancement bestows external
benefits not only on the current generation in the other country, but also
on future generations in both countries. Lower consumption likewise
bestows an external benefit on future generations. Cooperation increases
environmental quality, and so more capital is bequeathed to the next
generation. Intragenerational cooperation thus benefits future generations
as well as current generations, and so is Pareto improving.
Because both planners place the same shadow value on quality, they
equate the ratio of the benefits (in terms of consumption) of a marginal
decrease in quality in the two countries to the relative bargaining
strength:
U1( · )/v2( · )
U*1( · )/v3( · )
=
v*
v
.
Other things equal, a country with high bargaining strength will shift few
resources from consumption into enhancement. If that country happens to
be good at enhancement, much potential benefit from cooperation may be
lost.
The Role of Transfers
Transfers allow countries to exploit comparative advantage in enhance-
ment: output is allocated so that the marginal benefit of enhancement is
equated in each country (v2( · ) = v3( · )). Bargaining strength then shows up
solely in terms of relative consumption levels. In the presence of transfers,
however, short-lived cooperation may not be Pareto improving, precisely
because of this efficiency gain. With transfers, the planners can reallocate
enhancement resources to achieve the same level of quality using less
output. Consumption increases, and cooperation can thus result in a more
degraded environment.13
This is a somewhat unusual second-best result. The issue is not that
actions impose positive externalities on some and negative externalities on
12 Provided cooperation is voluntary, this must be true. If the cooperative equilibrium implied
that one country consumed more, the other country would be better off not cooperating. In
our setting, we can view the threat points from non-cooperation as providing bounds on the
relative values of v and v*.
13 To prove that such a result is possible, consider an economy that delivers a non-cooperative
equilibrium with environmental quality equal to Qp and with v2( · )8v3( · ). Now construct an
economy identical to this one, except with U (c/l, Q)=U (c/l, Qp) for QaQp (and likewise for
the foreign country). When the countries cooperate, they will still choose quality equal to Qp.
Since v2( · )8v3( · ), they can attain Qp with fewer resources devoted to enhancement.
Consumption rises, and future environmental capital therefore falls.
© The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics 1997.
380 A. A. John and R. A. Pecchenino
others. Internationalization of the intragenerational externality benefits
current and future generations. But cooperation entails more than the
internalization of externalities; it provides efficiency gains which free up
resources for consumption, and so hurt the future environment. Paradoxic-
ally, if countries exploit comparative advantage in enhancement, the result
may be degradation.
Coordination Failures
Under some circumstances, the Nash game between countries can yield
multiple equilibria. This could arise if there is strategic complementarity in
enhancement, so that increased enhancement in one country raises the
marginal benefit to enhancement in the other country.14 Countries that do
not cooperate might not even attain the best non-cooperative
equilibrium.
Intergenerational Altruism
Long-lived planners internalize the effects of one generation’s actions on
the welfare of future generations. In our setting, this implies a positive
shadow value on environmental capital. When allocating resources
between consumption and enhancement, such planners recognize that
consumption reduces future capital, and that the benefits of enhancement
extend beyond a single period. Thus long-lived planners place relatively
fewer resources into consumption and more into enhancement, than do
their short-lived counterparts. The result is higher capital and output, so
steady-state consumption may actually increase.15
When long-lived planners also engage in international cooperation, they
internalize the effects of both consumption and enhancement on the other
country. With equal bargaining strength, agents in the country with the
more polluting technology have lower consumption (see equation (12)).
For example, suppose home country consumption causes greater pollu-
tion: f2( · )sf3( · )s0. Then the marginal utility of consumption is higher in
the home country. Since both countries possess identical utility functions,
14 As a simple example, suppose that g(K) = 1, and that l = l* = 2.5Ly = y* = 2.5. Let
Q = hh* and let U(c, Q) = ln (c)+Q. It is easy to show that this economy has three Pareto-
ranked symmetric equilibria: h = h*b{0, 0.5, 2}. See Cooper and John (1988) for more on
coordination failures.
15 It is easy to construct examples where this is true. A simple example comes from the
functional forms assumed in Section V, setting fn = a, g = 1, and assuming that the fraction
of resources devoted to enhancement is less than a/(1µfd).
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consumption will be lower in the home country. If, however, vtav*t , this
result may be overturned.
V. Dynamics
We now analyze the dynamic properties of this model. We restrict atten-
tion to balanced growth paths and so assume some specific functional
forms:
U(c/l, Q) = s ln (c/l)+(1µs) ln (Q).
yt = g(Kt)lt = (Kt)glt;
Qt = v(Kt, ht, h*t ) = (Kt)d(ht)n(h*t )n*;
Kt+1 = f(Qt, ct, c*t ) = (Qt)f(ct)µa(c*t )µa*.
The Model with Transfers
When output can be transferred between countries, balanced growth
requires an equal growth rate of output in the two countries.16 This implies
that the ratio of outputs is constant over time. Hence, let y*t /yt = r, 9t.
Without loss of generality, assume rR1. Along a balanced growth path we
can write Tt = tyt, so resources in the home country equal (1µt)yt and
resources in the foreign country equal (r+t)yt. We then conjecture a
solution where the share of resources going to consumption is constant in
each country:
ct = h(1µt)yt; ht = (1µh) (1µt)yt; c*t = h*(r+t)yt;
h*t = (1µh*) (r+t)yt.
Substituting this conjectured solution in to the technologies, and simplify-
ing, we obtain the following dynamic equation for capital:
Kt+1 = A(Kt)fd+g(fnµa)+g(fn*µa*)(lt)(fnµa)+(fn*µa*);
A = (1µt)fnµa(r+t)(fn*µa*)(1µh)fn(1µh*)fn*hµa(h*)µa*.
(20)
We assume 0sfd+g(fnµa)+g(fn*µa*)s1.17 Here fd represents
the natural persistence of capital: when fd is low, capital depreciates
rapidly. The g(fnµa) term measures the net effect of growth in the home
country on the environment; enhancement activities improve the environ-
16 If K grows at a constant rate, so do y and y*. If these rates differ across countries, aggregate
output cannot be growing at a constant rate.
17 If fd+g(fnµa)+g(fn*µa*)a1, the model exhibits explosive growth. If
fd+g(fnµa)+g(fnµa*)s0, it exhibits oscillations: a high capital stock at date t degrades
the environment and so reduces environmental capital at t+1.
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ment, but consumption degrades it, so this term can be positive or nega-
tive. The g(fn*µa*) term captures the net effect of consumption and
enhancement in the foreign country.
is no population growth, the model tends to a steady state. The steady-
state level of capital (hence output) is decreasing in h and h*. The effect
of transfers on steady-state output depends on the relative size of the two
countries and the impact of each country’s growth on the environment.
Specifically, when t = 0, sgn (qK/qt) = sgn ((fn*µa*)µr(fnµa)). If
growth is more beneficial on net in the foreign country, transfers will
increase steady-state output. If (fn*µa*) = (fnµa*), then steady-state
output is maximized when post-transfer output is equalized internationally
(so 1µt = r+t).
If there is population growth, then the model can exhibit balanced
growth. From (20), the growth rate of capital is
gk =
[(fnµa)+(fn*µa*)]n
1µfdµg(fnµa)µg(fn*µa*)
.
Given gK, the growth rates of output and of quality can be derived:
gy = gy* = ggK+n; gQ = dgK+(n+n*)gy. Assuming positive population
growth, the key determinant of the overall growth rate is thus the net effect
of consumption and enhancement on capital. If this effect is positive, the
economy exhibits growth. If the effect is negative, the economy exhibits
persistent decline.
Environmental capital is a reproducible factor of production. As is now
well known from the literature on endogenous growth, we obtain balanced
growth with positive population growth rates if the returns to scale associ-
ated with the reproducible factor (fd+g(fnµa)+g(fn*µa*)) are less
than unity. (If population is constant in both countries, we have balanced
growth only if fd+g(fnµa)+g(fn*µa*) = 1.) The division of output
between consumption and enhancement has level effects but is not a
determinant of the growth rate; growth depends only on exogenously given
parameters. Whether we obtain sustained growth or sustained decline is
purely a technological matter.
We now need to check that our conjectured solution is consistent with
the first-order conditions. Given our assumptions on technology, given the
conjectures, and using l = l*, the first-order conditions are:
h(1µt)lt yt = svt ltµa(jt+j*t )Kt+1; (1µh) (1µt)lt yt = n(mt+m*t )Qt;
h*(r+t)lt yt = sv*t l*t µa*(jt+j*t )Kt+1;
(1µh*) (r+t)lt yt = n*(mt+m*t )Qt;
(mt+m*t )Qt = (1µs)vt lt+(1µs)v*t l*t +f(jt+j*t )Kt+1
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(jt+j*t )Kt+1 = y(lt+1 yt+1(g+rg*)+d(mt+1+m*t+1)Qt).
From inspection, these conditions are consistent with balanced growth if
the growth rate of vt lt equals the growth rate of v*t l*t .18 Let this growth rate
equal g. We already know the growth rates of y, Q and K implied by the
technology. Along a balanced growth path, the growth rates of the multi-
pliers are such that the growth rates of ly, (m+m*)Q, and (j+j*)K all
equal g.
Let L = (1+g)µtlt yt; J = (1+g)µt(jt+j*t )Kt+1; M = (1+g)µt(mt+m*t )Qt;
N = (1+g)µtvt lt; and N* = (1+g)µtv*t l*t . Here, J, L and M are the period
zero values of capital, output and quality, weighted by their shadow prices.
The first-order conditions in all periods along the balanced growth path
are then equivalent to
h(1µt)L = sNµaJ; (1µh) (1µt)L = nM; h*(r+t)L = sN*µa*J;
(1µh*) (r+t)L = n*M; M = (1µs)N+(1µs)N*+fJ;
J = y(L(g+rg*)+dM).
These equations imply that
J =
y(N+N*) (((g+rg*)/(1+r)) (s+(1µs) (n+n*))+(1µs)d)
1µyfdµy((g+rg*)/(1+r)) ((fnµa)+(fn*µa*))
.
This expression is increasing in g, g*, n, n*, y, f, d, N, and N*; it is
increasing in r iff g*ag; and it is decreasing in a and a*.19 Furthermore,
h
1µh
=
sNµaJ
n(1µs) (N+N*)+fJ
;
h*
1µh*
=
sN*µa*J
n*(1µs) (N+N*)+fJ
.
These expressions are decreasing in J: when capital is more valuable, both
countries put relatively fewer resources into consumption and more into
enhancement. Finally, we can write the transfer rate in terms of h and
h*:
t =
n*(1µh)µrn(1µh*)
n*(1µh)+n(1µh*)
.
This is decreasing in h, n, and r, and increasing in h* and n*.
18 This will occur, for example, if the planner in each country considers the welfare of a
representative agent, so v falls at the rate of population growth and the growth rate of vl is
zero. Alternatively, if the planners adopt utilitarian social welfare functions, so v is constant,
then the growth rates will be equal if population grows at the same rate in the two
countries.
19 Since M = (1µs) (N+N*)+fJ, it has the same comparative static properties.
© The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics 1997.
384 A. A. John and R. A. Pecchenino
The case of cooperative short-lived planners with transfers is similar. In
such a setting J = 0. The consumption-enhancement ratio depends only on
relative bargaining strength, the productivity of enhancement, and the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and quality. Short-
lived planners put more resources into consumption than do long-lived
planners.
The Model without Transfers
If output cannot be transferred across national boundaries, then balanced
growth is possible even when the growth rates of output differ in the two
countries. Consider first the case of long-lived cooperative planners.
Conjecturing ct = hyt and c*t = h*y*t , the technologies imply that
Kt+1 = A(Kt)fd+g(fn µa)+g*(fn*µa*)(lt)(fnµa)(l*t )(fn*µa*);
A = (1µh)fn(1µh*)fn *hµa(h*)µa*;
LgK =
(fnµa)n+(fn*µa*)dn*
1µfdµg(fnµa)µg*(fn*µa*)
.
The first-order conditions are derived as before. For balanced growth, we
again need the growth rates of vt lt and v*t l*t to be equal. We then find that
the qualitative properties of J, the period zero value of capital, are similar
to those obtained above, and are identical if g = g*. The solutions for the
share of resources devoted to consumption, h and h*, have the same form
as before. The analysis for cooperative short-lived planners entails setting
J = 0 (and does not need equal growth rates of vt lt and v*t l*t ).
The behavior of long-lived non-cooperative planners is also qualitatively
similar. The solution for the growth rate is unaffected. The first-order
conditions in the home country are identical to those above with all foreign
country parameters set to zero. Consequently, capital is valued less by an
individual country than by cooperative planners, so individual countries
put more resources into consumption. The analysis for short-lived planners
is a special case, since they put no value on capital; as before, this means
J = 0.
VI. Conclusion
Many environmental problems have international and intertemporal
dimensions. The list is long and well known: CO2 and CFC emissions affect
the atmosphere and the stratosphere and so influence future climate and
health; loss of biodiversity could mean the loss of new drugs; acid rain
crosses international borders and destroys long-lived forests; overfishing of
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the world’s oceans reduces future fish stocks; pollution damages oceans
and shared lakes and river basins; air pollution reduces health and produc-
tivity; and many others.20
We develop a model of international and intergenerational externalities
where the environment is a global public good that affects both produc-
tivity and welfare. International cooperation without transfers results in
greater environmental improvement. Cooperation with transfers may
allow countries to exploit comparative advantage in environmental
enhancement, which, paradoxically, may lead to greater environmental
degradation. Altruistic short-lived agents take account of the long-lived
results of their actions. Our model is consistent with either sustained
growth or long-run decline.
Recently, many nations have signed a number of international agree-
ments concerning maintenance of the environment. These include the
Montreal Protocol, which limits the production of CFCs, and the Bio-
diversity Treaty, which seeks to protect genetic diversity. Both agreements
require an international perspective, because of static externalities, and an
intergenerational perspective, since most of the benefit will fall on future
generations. Our paper helps explain why transfers have been called for
from the developed to the developing world. the main beneficiaries of
many agreements, at least in the short-run, are the developed countries,
while it is in the developing countries that improving environmental quality
may be easier. Thus, the developing world must be compensated for their
environmental maintenance expenditures. But our paper also sounds a
cautionary note: international agreements with transfers that lack an inter-
generational perspective could actually harm the environment.
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